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INDIVIDUAL VULNERABILITY AND 
CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION 
Eric J. Mitnick* 
MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND 
WOMEN'S RIGHTS. By Aye/et Shachar. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­
versity Press. 2001. Pp. xiv, 193. $17.97. 
Perhaps the most pressing problem in multicultural theory and 
practice today is the problem of individual vulnerability. Most 
interested theorists and multicultural states now accept the basic 
premise that some degree of state accommodation of minority cultural 
practice is required as a matter of justice.' Debate then shifts to the 
best justifications for, and the appropriate extent of, such group­
differentiated policy. Too often lost amid these discussions is the 
plight of vulnerable members of accommodated cultural groups: indi­
viduals subject to repression within their cultural groups, but who lose 
a critical aspect of their identities upon exit; individuals who would 
retain their cultural membership, but also their rights as individuals. 
It is not that the problem of individual cultural vulnerability goes 
unsolved because it goes unnoticed. Rather, the problem itself 
receives little prescriptive attention because most theorists who 
consider the problem consider it to be insoluble.2 In her valuable new 
book on multiculturalism, however, Ayelet Shachar3 takes the plight 
of vulnerable cultural group members, particularly women, as her 
primary focus. Further, she offers innovative legal-institutional 
prescriptions designed to permit the retention and simultaneous trans­
formation of cultural identities. Yet, in Multicultural Jurisdictions, 
Shachar also underestimates the extent to which her legal model is 
derivative of extant theory and overestimates the efficacy of her own 
prescriptive design. 
In the second Part of this Review, I consider Shachar's analysis of 
the relationship between state accommodationist policy and intra­
group repression, or what Shachar terms the "paradox of multicultural 
* Assistant Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. AB. 1988, Cornell; J .D. 1991, 
University of Michigan; M.A. (Politics) 1998, Princeton. - Ed. 
l. See Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Introduction to CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE 
SOCIETIES 1, 4 (Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman eds., 2000) (assessing the current state of 
multiculturalism within Western democracies). 
2. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
3. Assistant Professor, University of Toronto Faculty of Law. 
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vulnerability" (p. 3). While there is perhaps less that is novel in 
Shachar's descriptive account than one might reasonably anticipate, 
the context she brings to bear on the plight of vulnerable individuals is 
itself a significant virtue. In particular, Shachar's treatment of the 
problem as it arises in the context of family law helpfully demonstrates 
the ways that costs of multicultural accommodation may be dispropor­
tionately borne by women. 
In Part III, I take up Shachar's institutional prescriptions for the 
transformation of illiberal cultural groups. In her conception of a joint, 
but competitive, state-cultural jurisdictional scheme - a scheme 
through which cultural elites would be induced, and vulnerable mem­
bers empowered, to revise repressive cultural practices - Shachar of­
fers an approach that is genuinely path-breaking. Yet, for all its 
ingenuity, Shachar's model remains underdeveloped. The prescrip­
tions Shachar offers in Multicultural Jurisdictions, at least as they now 
stand, would have little effect on the lives of most at-risk group 
members, including those most vulnerable to the authority of cultural 
group majorities and elites. 
First, though, we shall need to locate Shachar's work within (or 
perhaps beyond) the broader framework of liberal-multicultural 
theory. This is the subject of Part I. 
I. LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM 
A. Culture, Community, and Justice 
Like so many other ongoing discussions in modem liberal theory, 
the recent multicultural debates have their roots ultimately in Rawls's 
conception of justice,4 specifically in the well-known communitarian 
response to that conception.5 The thrust of the communitarian 
critique, relevant for present purposes, contends that Rawls's theory 
relies on an overly atomistic, unrealistically universalized conception 
of the self as prior to its ends. 6 The Rawlsian conception of the person, 
communitarians charge, is both false, because individuals naturally 
exist encumbered by particular social attachments, and ultimately 
dangerous, because the radical valorization of individual right threat-
4. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1 971).  
5. Works illustrative of the communitarian critique of Rawlsian liberalism include 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981); MICHAEL 
J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) [hereinafter SANDEL, 
LIBERALISM]; MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY (1 983); Charles Taylor, Atomism, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 187-211 (1.985). For an overview of these works, see Amy Gut­
mann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308 (1985). 
6. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 560 ("For the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by 
it; even a dominant end must be chosen from among numerous possibilities."). 
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ens the virtues of civic and communal life.7 There was thus an obvious, 
though misleading, correlation at the outset of the recent debates in 
multicultural theory between proponents of cultural rights and 
communitarian critics of liberalism.8 The early proponents of cultural 
rights, like their communitarian counterparts, were similarly con­
cerned with the affirmation of particular (i.e., cultural or communal) 
attachments.9 
This initial correlation between communitarianism and multicul­
turalism was in part bred of a confusion over the nature of cultural 
rights. Many theorists assumed that claims for cultural rights were, in 
essence, assertions of group or communal rights.10 On this basis, the 
multicultural debate was originally thought of as yet another front in 
the broader dispute between individualists and collectivists over the 
relative priority of the self and its ends. Liberal theorists thus initially 
rejected multicultural claims for fear of sacrificing the precedence of 
the individual to that of the community.II Even more, cultural rights 
were (as it happens, correctly) perceived as claims for a formally 
unequal distribution of benefits and duties among persons in society 
on the basis of group membership. Liberal theorists thus initially also 
opposed claims for cultural rights in defense of what they took to be 
liberal neutrality.12 As a result, the first liberal proponents of multicul-
7. MACINTYRE, supra note 5, at 204-05; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S 
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 14 (1996) [hereinafter 
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT] ("Unless we think of ourselves as encumbered 
selves, already claimed by certain projects and commitments, we cannot make sense of . . .  
indispensable aspects of our moral and political experience."); SANDEL, LIBERALISM, supra 
note 5, at 152-54. In this sense, the communitarian critique echoes the earlier sentiments of 
Marx. See Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 26, 42 (Rob­
ert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1843) ("But liberty as a right of man is not founded upon the 
relations between man and man, but rather upon the separation of man from man. It is the 
right of such separation. The right of the circumscribed individual, withdrawn into him­
self."). 
8. For an overview of the evolution of the debate over cultural rights, see WILL 
KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM AND 
CITIZENSHIP 17-38 (2001) (hereinafter KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR] .  
9. See, e.g., Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic 
Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615 (1992); Ronald Garet, Communality and Existence: 
The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983); Darlene M. Johnston, Native Rights 
as Collective Rights: A Q!testion of Group Self-Preservation, 2 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 
19 (1989); Michael McDonald, Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal In­
dividualism, 4 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 217 (1991); Frances Svensson, Liberal Democ­
racy and Group Rights: The Legacy of Individualism and Its Impact on American Indian 
Tribes, 27 POL. STUD. 421 (1979); Vernon Van Dyke, Collective Entities and Moral Rights: 
Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought, 44 J. POL. 21 (1 982). 
10. See sources cited supra note 9. 
11 . WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF 
MINORITY RIGHTS 46 (1995) (hereinafter KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP]. 
12. For a recent articulation of this view, see BRIAN BARRY. CULTURE AND EQUALITY: 
AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTICULTURALISM (2001), contending that cultural 
rights contravene liberal egalitarian principles. 
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turalism faced a dual challenge: they first needed to dispel the notion 
that cultural group-differentiated rights were detrimental to individual 
interests; and second, they needed to· establish how it was that official 
group-differentiated policies and institutions, insofar as they distin­
guished among categories of persons in the distribution of benefits and 
duties, were not prima facie contrary to justice. I 3  
Liberal multiculturalists thus set about the task of explaining that 
although rights grounded in cultural differences clearly are strongly 
associated with cultural group membership, this does not demonstrate 
that cultural rights must be essentially equivalent to group or collec­
tive rights. I4 Rather, cultural rights merely vest on the basis of cultural 
membership, and most such rights (for example, language rights, rights 
freely to practice one's religion) vest legally in individuals rather than 
in any collective entity. Is There indeed may be cultural rights that 
vest in, and can only be asserted by, a group qua group (a right to 
collective self-determination, for example), but these are exceedingly 
rare in modern liberal democracies.I 6  Moreover, even rights that logi­
cally can be pressed only by a collectivity remain grounded in individ­
ual interests; rights such as these remain legitimate only to the extent 
that they benefit individuals on the basis of their membership in the 
particular group at issue. I7 
Furthermore, the notion that modern liberal states, composed of a 
plurality of ethnic, religious and (intra)national groups, could be 
truly neutral with respect to culture has been exposed as fiction.18 
Governments necessarily make decisions on a broad range of matters 
that affect culturally identified persons in disparate ways. Public 
13. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989) 
[hereinafter KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE); IRIS MARION 
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990); Charles Taylor, The Politics of 
Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1994). 
14. See, e.g., Michael Hartney, Some Confusions Regarding Collective Rights, in THE 
RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 202-27 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995); Jan Narveson, Collec­
tive Rights?, 4 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 329 (1991). 
15. For a discussion of the investitive conditions of rights in individuals, see D.N. 
MacCormick, Rights in Legislation, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR 
OF H.L.A. HART 189, 204-05 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977). 
16. See, e.g., Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHIL. 
439 (1990). For a helpful typology of cultural rights, see Ja�ob T. Levy, Classifying Cultural 
Rights, in NOMOS XXXIX: ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 22 (Ian Shapiro & Will 
Kymlicka eds., 1997). 
17. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 207-09 (1986). 
18. See JOSEPH CARENS, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP AND COMMUNITY: A CONTEXTUAL 
EXPLORATION OF JUSTICE AS EVENHANDEDNESS 53 (2000) ("[C)ultural neutrality is an il­
lusion."); KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11, at 111 (arguing that 
cultural neutrality is "patently false"); KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR, supra 
note 8, at 32 ("[M)ainstream institutions are not neutral, but rather are implicitly or explic­
itly tilted towards the interests and identities of the majority group."). 
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schooling, for example, and provision of other public services and 
institutions (e.g., court systems, health and welfare agencies) must 
occur in some language, and there will inevitably be members of 
particular cultural groups placed at a disadvantage by such linguistic 
choices.19 Similarly, decisions to close government offices on particular 
public holidays - indeed the very structure of the "work week" itself 
- and decisions with respect to. st�te symbols, rituals, and uniforms, 
will disadvantage some persons on the basis of their culture while 
granting advantages to others.20 And it would likely surprise few of us 
to learn that most of these decisions tend to privilege, implicitly or 
explicitly, the dominant or majority culture.21 Moreover, even self­
conscious efforts to remedy cultural disadvantages by devolving 
decisionmaking authority to more local levels generate certain cultural 
inequities, for the decisions regarding the drawing of geographical 
and jurisdictional boundaries themselves then become culturally 
sensitive.22 State-sanctioned minority cultural group-differentiated 
policies are thus commonly defended by multicultural theorists as a 
reasonable remedy for inevitable official partiality. 
B. Autonomy and Toleration 
Thus, the more interesting contemporary debates in multicultural 
theory rarely co'ncern the essential justice of culturally differentiated 
policies per se. Rather, recent discussions tend to accept as an initial 
premise that official differential treatment is made necessary by state 
bias toward particular conceptions of the good, and so have focused 
instead on the appropriate extent of, and occasions for, such differen­
tial treatment. Indeed, with the exposure of ethnocultural neutrality as 
fantasy, cultural rights have in recent years found a rather congenial 
resting place directly in the heart of liberal theory.23 Yet questions re­
garding just how far liberal society should go in accommodating the 
19. See Charles Taylor, .Nationalism and Modernity, in THE MORALITY OF 
NATIONALISM 31, 34 (Jeff McMahan & Robert McKim eds. , 1997) ("[A] state-sponsored, -
inculcated, and - defined language and culture, in which both economy and state function, 
is obviously an immense advantage to people if this language and culture are theirs."). 
20. CARENS, supra note 18, at 54 (stating that public holidays and state symbols "are 
always culturally laden"); KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11, at 114-
15 (arguing that in countries like Canada and the United States, state symbols, public holi­
days, the work-week, and government uniforms tend to "reflect the needs· of Christians"). 
21. KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR, supra note 8, at 24-25 (noting the tim­
ing of admission of states into the union reflect choices "deliberately made to ensure that 
angolophones would be a majority within each of the fifty states of the American federa­
tion"). 
22. CARENS, supra note 18, at 54; KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra 
note 11, at 112. 
23. Indeed, Rawls himself has recast his theory to account for private attachments. See 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
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claims of minority cultural groups have been answered variously 
depending principally upon how respondents regard the fundamental 
nature of the liberal justification for differential rights. That is to say, 
while debates over multiculturalism have now largely become debates 
within liberal theory, they have also evolved into debates fundamen­
tally about liberal theory, or about the nature and principal commit­
ments of liberalism and the liberal state.24 
Without doubt, the prevailing point of view in the recent multicul­
tural literature has taken autonomy as the fundamental value in liberal 
theory.25 The predominance of the autonomy perspective in liberal 
multicultural theory is due in no small measure to its obvious associa­
tion with, indeed derivation from, the classical conceptions of liberal­
ism put forth by Kant, Mill, and Rawls.26 What this emphasis means 
for multiculturalism is that, far from resting claims for cultural recog­
nition and accommodation on communal interests (as in the first stage 
of the debate described above), group-differentiated rights are now 
substantially more likely to be defended as essential to individual well­
being.27 
And the relationship is not hard to see. Liberalism grounded in the 
autonomy perspective is committed at its deepest levels to individual 
self-invention;28 yet one of the principal ways in which persons define 
24. Proponents of both of the broadly defined perspectives on liberalism described be­
low urge a fundamental reconceptualization of liberal society as deeply plural. See Chandran 
Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 69, 84 (Ian Shapiro & 
Will Kymlicka eds., 1997) [hereinafter Kukathas, Cultural Toleration] ("[W]e should think of 
the public realm as an area of convergence of different moral practices."); Joseph Raz, Mul­
ticulturalism, 1 1  RATIO JURIS 1 93, 197 (1998) ("We should learn to think of our societies as 
consisting not of a majority and minorities, but as constituted by a plurality of cultural 
groups. "). For an alternative view, criticizing liberalism as an authoritative basis for dis­
cerning the propriety of cultural policies on the ground that liberalism is itself "embedded in 
a particular culture, " see BHIKHU PAREKH, RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM: CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL THEORY 338 (2000). 
25. See KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11; JOSEPH RAZ, Multi­
culturalism: A Liberal Perspective, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE 
MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 1 55 (rev. ed. 1 995). 
26. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H.J. 
Paton trans., HarperCollins Publishers 1 964) (1785); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 
(Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Random House 1974) (1859); RAWLS, supra note 4; John Rawls, 
Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515 (1980). 
27. See KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 1 1 ,  at 105 (stating that 
cultural membership enables individual choice); RAZ, supra note 25, at 178 (commenting 
that cultural groups' "moral claim to respect and to prosperity rests entirely on their vital 
importance to the prosperity of individual human beings"). But see Chandran Kukathas, Are 
There Any Cultural Rights?, 20 POL. THEORY 105, 107 (1992) [hereinafter Kukathas, Are 
There Any Cultural Rights?] (observing that liberalism's "emphasis on individual rights or 
individual liberty bespeaks not hostility to the interests of communities but wariness of the 
power of the majority over minorities"). 
28. "(I]t is the privilege and proper condition of a human being . . .  to use and interpret 
experience in his own way . . . .  He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his 
plan of life for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. " 
MILL, supra note 26, at 122-23. 
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themselves is through social attachments. "For most people," as 
Joseph Raz has written, "membership in their cultural group is a 
major determinant of their sense of who they are; it provides a strong 
focus of identification; it contributes to what we have come to call 
their sense of their own identity."29 Hence, insofar as membership in a 
particular cultural group may constitute an aspect of identity, rights 
that respect such cultural attachments serve rather directly to protect 
crucial individual interests.3° Further, in contrast to communitarian 
conceptions of the self, liberal theorists envision even constitutive 
ends and attachments as subject to critical reflection and revision.31 
This is why official recognition and accommodation of diverse cultural 
attachments is deemed essential to liberal individualism; cultural asso­
ciations provide the critical "contexts of choice" within which 
individuals may define and revise aspects of our selves.32 According to 
the autonomy perspective, then, cultural rights are conceived of as 
(some of) the instruments of liberal self-invention. 
At the same time, there remain significant differences among 
adherents to the prevailing autonomy perspective in liberal multicul­
turalism, particularly regarding which types of groups should receive 
differential treatment. For example, Will Kymlicka, who has done 
perhaps more than any other theorist to frame the current debate, 
29. RAZ, supra note 25, at 178; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that "individuals define themselves" through freely cho­
sen relationships); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984) (finding 
that associational freedom "safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that 
is central to any concept of liberty"). 
30. To be clear, this is not to say that human identity may be constituted according 
solely to any particular characteristic or affiliation; this is not, in other words, an argument 
grounded in essentialism. It is instead an acknowledgement that one's culture contributes to 
one's identity, and that one's identity is otherwise complex, unique, and reflective of multi­
ple and cross-cutting attachments and concerns. On the compound nature of human identity, 
see IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 88-89 (2000); Craig Calhoun, So­
cial Theory and the Politics of Identity, in SOCIAL THEORY AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 
27-29 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1994). For discussions of the constitutive nature of group attach­
ments see IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
(1996); RAZ, supra note 25, at 178; ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING 
VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997); Robert w. Gordon, Critical Legal Histo­
ries, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Eric J. Mitnick, Constitutive Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 185 (2000). 
31. " (F)ree persons conceive of themselves as beings who can revise and alter their final 
ends and who give first priority to preserving their liberty in these matters." John Rawls, Re­
ply to Alexander and Musgrave, in COLLECTED PAPERS 232, 240 (Samuel Freeman ed., 
1999); see also KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11, at 91 (stating that 
conceptions of the good change "even for those people
· 
wlio think of themselves as having 
constitutive ends"); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, in 
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra (positing that "our conceptions of the good may and often do 
change over time, usually slowly but sometimes rather suddenly"). 
32. KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE, supra note 13, at 166 (1989) 
(arguing that "cultural structure . . .  (should be) recognized as a context of choice"); 
KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11, at 82-84 (describing "societal 
culture" as a critical "context of choice"). 
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draws a critical distinction between indigenous minority national 
groups (for example, Native American and Alaskan tribes), that have 
been collectively and coercively incorporated into a broader multina­
tional state (like the United States), and ethnic immigrant groups, 
composed of persons who have been incorporated on an individual or 
familial, and to some extent volitional, basis.33 Members of incorpo­
rated national groups, Kymlicka argues, arrive (though, of course, they 
have never truly left) still firmly entrenched in their own "socie.tal 
culture," with its distinct institutions and social practices.34 Members of 
ethnic immigrant groups, on the other hand, may bring with them 
certain aspects of their former lives, such as language and collective 
historical narratives, but will of necessity have left behind the institu­
tionalized practices that formed the core of their previous societal 
cultures.35 And since Kymlicka considers access to a societal culture a 
precondition of liberal justice, this distinction matters greatly. Indeed, 
for Kymlicka it justifies affording more extensive cultural rights to 
members of minority national groups, who require continuing access 
to their own societal cultures in order to live autonomous lives, than to 
members of ethnic immigrant groups, who may more readily achieve 
autonomy within the societal culture of the dominant national group.36 
Unsurprisingly, there is considerable disagreement among liberal 
multicultural theorists of the autonomy perspective both over the 
viability of the notion of a "societal culture" itself and over the propri­
ety of the distinctions Kymlicka draws between different types of cul­
tural groups on the basis of that construct. Joseph Carens, for exam­
ple, has noted that Kymlicka's conception of access to a single societal 
culture as a precondition of liberal justice, combined with his willing­
ness to fold immigrants within the dominant societal culture, leads 
logically to a blanket preclusion of distinctive cultural rights for ethnic 
immigrants.37 Carens adheres to the basic notion of culture as an 
essential context of choice for autonomous individuals, but conceives 
of the sources of cultural meaning as "multiple, varying and overlap­
ping," rather than as homogenous Kymlickian societal cultures. 
Rather than drawing categorical lines between different types of 
33. See KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11, at 10-12. 
34. Kymlicka defines "societal culture" as "a culture which provides its members with 
meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educa­
tional, religious, recreational and economic life, encompassing both public and private 
spheres." Id. at 76. 
35. Id. at 77-78. 
36. Id. at 82-84. 
37. CARENS, supra note 1 8, at 57. 
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cultural groups, we serve justice best, Carens argues, by being more 
attentive to the full context of particular cultural claims.38 
Another group of liberal commentators, even more interested in 
protecting cultural identities, have sought to challenge the prevailing 
autonomy perspective itself. Theorists such as William Galston and 
Chandran Kukathas have argued that liberalism, properly conceptu­
alized, is rooted not in the notion of autonomy but in the ideals of 
toleration and diversity.39 Galston and Kukathas both ground their 
alternative perspectives in a vigorous libertarianism. Galston, for 
example, suggests that: "The heart of the tolerance a liberal society 
needs is the refusal to use state power to impose one's way of life on 
others." 40 And Kukathas maintains: "For each social union to have any 
significant measure of integrity, it must to some extent be impervious 
to the values of the wider society." 41 Yet what is most critical in under­
standing the arguments offered by these toleration theorists is 
precisely that extent, or the degree to which each theorist is willing to 
take their distrust of state authority in the realm of culture. For the 
foundational similarity in their approaches to justifying cultural free­
dom on the grounds of toleration and diversity belies an even more 
fundamental difference in their conceptions of liberal society and the 
political state. 
For instance, although Galston at one point claims both instrumen­
tal and intrinsic virtue in diversity, it seems reasonably clear that what 
he is most concerned with is respecting diversity as a means toward 
achieving social stability, or a fair modus vivendi.42 Kukathas, on the 
other hand, defends toleration as an independent value, one constitu-
38. Id. at 72-77; see also Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Al­
ternative, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 93 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995) (criticizing 
Kymlicka's notion of a homogenous "cultural structure"). 
39. William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516, 524 (1995) 
("Rather than taking autonomy or critical reflection as our point of departure, what we need 
instead is an account of liberalism that gives diversity its due."); Kukathas, Cultural Tolera­
tion, supra note 24, at 99 (stating that "at the core of liberalism is the idea of toleration"). 
The recent distinction between what I have termed above the autonomy and tolerance per­
spectives arose in a series of articles and responses between Kymlicka and Kukathas. See 
Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, supra note 27, at 120; Chandran Kukathas, Cul- · 
tural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka, 20 POL. THEORY 674, 680 (1992) [hereinafter 
Kukathas, Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka] ("The differences [between 
Kymlicka and Kukathas] stem, ultimately from two views of liberalism. "); Will Kymlicka, 
The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas, 20 POL. THEORY 1 40 (1992). 
40. Galston, supra note 39, at 524. 
41. Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, supra note 27, at 127. 
42. See Galston, supra note 39, at 527 (recognizing diversity as instrumentally and intrin­
sically valuable); id. at 519 ("All too often the alternative to finding a way of living together 
-a modus vivendi-is cruel and bloody strife."). 
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tive of public reason.43 Whereas Galston remains committed . to 
diversity and mutual toleration "[w]ithin a framework of civic unity," 
Kukathas would, without reservation, sacrifice social unity for tolera­
tion.4 4 And where Galston continues to conceive of the liberal state as 
constructed broadly for the attainment of "shared liberal purposes," 
Kukathas conceptualizes the public realm as the "convergence of 
different moral practices" including, but not limited to, liberalism. 45 In 
practical terms, these conceptual differences matter dramatically; 
Kukathas's cultural libertarianism becomes far more radical than 
Galston's. For example, while Galston's conception of liberalism as 
toleration would nonetheless urge a "vigorous" liberal civic education 
and "strong prohibitions . . . against the use of coercion to prevent 
individuals from leaving . . .  [cultural] groups," Kukathas's would 
sustain "communities which bring up children unschooled and illiter­
ate" and exclude intervention "[ e]ven in cases where there is clear 
evidence of terrible practices."4 6 Hence, the toleration perspective on 
liberalism exhibits a certain degree of diversity of its own. 
C. A New Path? 
Recent liberal-multicultural theory has thus been marked by two 
major stances: the autonomy and toleration perspectives on liberalism. 
Moreover, there has been a significant range of disagreement between 
the two as well as within each perspective. Yet on one issue, the views 
of all of the above commentators converge. Theorists of the autonomy 
and toleration perspectives commonly presume an inevitable clash 
between the collective interests of any given cultural group and the 
individual interests of certain of its members. 
Adherents of both the autonomy and toleration perspectives 
generally countenance what Kymlicka has called "external protec­
tions," or group-differentiated policies designed to "protect a pc;trticu­
lar ethnic or national group from the destabilizing impact of the deci­
sions of the larger society." 47 These sorts of protections - for 
example, conduct exemptions granted to members of· particular 
religious groups, or rights to the use of particular languages or natural 
resources - seek to achieve a fair degree of equality between different 
groups in society. Where the perspectives differ, however, is with 
43. Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, supra note 24, at 83 ("Toleration is not important 
because it promotes reason . . .. [T]oleration is important because if toleration is forsaken 
then so is reason. "). 
44. Galston, supra note 39, at 526; Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, supra note 24, at 99. 
45. Galston, supra note 39, at 525; Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, supra note 24, at 84. 
46. Galston, supra note 39, at 528; Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, supra note 24, at 87, 
89. 
47. KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11, at 37. 
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respect to what Kymlicka terms "internal restrictions," or cultural 
group claims "to restrict the liberty of [group] members in the name of 
group solidarity."48 These sorts of claims, ranging from constraints on 
criticism of group customs to practices involving mutilation and 
arguably torture, seek collective freedom to preserve and implement 
traditional practices, even at the expense of individual freedom and 
equality within particular groups.49 
With respect to claims for internal restrictions, theorists who take 
autonomy as liberalism's fundamental commitment would privilege 
individual over collective freedom, whereas theorists who conceive of 
liberalism's core as toleration would more readily sacrifice intragroup 
individual liberty to cultural tradition. Indeed, this point of diver­
gence, as described here by Kukathas, serves as the essential presup­
position of the current liberal-multicultural debate: 
My contention here is that we are faced with a fundamental conflict 
between two irreconcilable aspirations: on one hand, to leave cultural 
communities alone to manage their own affairs, whatever we may think 
of their values; and, on the other hand, to champion the claims or the in­
terests of individuals who, we think, are disadvantaged by their commu­
nities' lack of regard for certain values. Unfortunately, one cannot have 
it both ways.50 
In Multicultural Jurisdictions, however, Shachar aims to disprove 
this presupposition. She maintains that we can indeed have it both 
ways. To do so, however, Shachar argues that we need "a new way of 
practicing multiculturalism" (p. 5), one that will "align the benefits of 
enhanced external protections between groups with the benefits of re­
duced internal restrictions" (p. 8). We need a "brave new blueprint" 
(p. 7) that will enable us to "strive[] for the reduction of injustice 
between groups, together with the enhancement of justice within 
them" (p. 4). We need "a new and better way of accommodating 
difference" (p. xi), "[t]ruly new thinking on multiculturalism" (p. 15), 
"new and better legal-institutional mechanisms" (p. 62), "a new 
architecture for dividing and sharing authority in the multicultural 
state" (p. 13), even "a radically new architecture for dividing and 
sharing authority in the multicultural state" (p. 88; emphasis added). 
Shachar is clearly correct that a new approach is needed. The 
problem is that too much of what Shachar offers here is not new, and 
the portion that is genuinely innovative, at least as it stands, will not 
work. But Multicultural Jurisdictions represents an important institu­
tional turn in the multicultural debate, an opening that theorists 
should seize upon and further develop. Indeed, as I shall demonstrate 
48. Id. at 36. 
49. See Amy Gutmann, The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics, 22 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 171, 195 (1993) (noting that "clitoridectomy may qualify as a form of torture"). 
50. Kukathas, Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka, supra note 39, at 678. 
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below, while Shachar's descriptive project here too often recycles 
prior discussions, her institutional prescriptions are likely to frame the 
debate for years to come. 
II. CULTURAL GROUPS AND INDIVIDUAL VULNERABILITY 
A. The Paradox of Multicultural Vulnerability 
Shachar's descriptive project begins with twin admonitions, 
familiar to the multicultural literature, regarding the nature of per­
sonal identity and the structure of society. First, Shachar cautions, we 
must "re-acquaint ourselves with the complex and multi-layered 
nature of multicultural identity" (p. 15). This is the now proverbial 
reminder to avoid overessentializing the cultural aspect of group 
members' identities. The idea, which virtually all theorists appear to 
have accepted, is that no individual may be constituted according 
solely to any particular aspect of their identity; rather, all persons exist 
as complex psychic entities, with multiple, crosscutting and even 
contradictory attachments and concerns.51 Second, and relatedly, 
Shachar reminds her readers that modern society is structured 
according to the "multicultural triad" of group, state, and individual, 
and that the individual will "have interests and rights that derive from 
concurrent membership in both group and state" (p. 5). 
As we have seen above, and as Shachar reminds us here, the multi­
dimensional nature of human identity and modern society serve in 
most accounts of liberal multiculturalism as critical elements in the 
justification of official group-differentiated policies and institutions.52 
Yet Shachar emphasizes these aspects not to buttress further the 
interests of cultural groups, but rather to focus attention on the inter­
ests of the individuals within such groups (p. 6). Her point is that while 
state accommodation of cultural difference may be required as a 
matter of justice, we must at the same time not lose sight of our critical 
concern for the general rights and life opportunities of the individual 
members of cultural groups once the group has been accommodated. 
"In an ideal world," writes Shachar, "enhancing the autonomy of 
nomoi groups would also always improve the status of at risk individu­
als inside the group, or at least would never serve to legitimate the 
maltreatment of certain group members."53 In reality, however, certain 
51. See YOUNG, supra note 30, at 88-89; Calhoun, supra note 30, at 27-29; Mitnick, supra 
note 30, at 200. Anthony Appiah has noted the existence of both collective and personal di­
mensions of individual identity. See K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival: 
M11/tic11/t11ra/ Societies and Social Reproduction, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE 
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 149, 151 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994). 
52. See supra Section J.B. 
53. Pp. 4-5. Shachar's reference to cultural groups as "nomoi groups" is derived from 
Robert Cover's use of the Greek nomos to describe a discrete legal culture, or a collection of 
May 2003] Vulnerability and Transformation 1647 
traditional practices for which cultural groups will seek accommoda­
tion will directly contravene the individual rights of particular group 
members, even to the point of being radically repressive. Even more, 
the state will then be complicit in the cultural repression of vulnerable 
group members, for the vulnerability of particular categories of 
persons, and in particular women, is often already deeply encoded in 
cultural nomoi. State accommodation thus serves at times to perpetu­
ate already existing power hierarchies and, with them, intragroup 
repression (p. 47). "[H]ow" then, Shachar asks, "do we protect group 
members from routine violations of their citizenship rights, when 
those violations arise from the traditional practices of the group 
which we have already sanctioned through accommodation?" (p. 3). 
This is the dilemma that Shachar terms "the paradox of multicultural 
vulnerability" (p. 3). 
Now, the reality of threats to individual members of cultural 
groups from state accommodation of traditional practices has been 
discussed at length by numerous theorists.54 Yet even if her identifica­
tion of this multicultural dilemma is itself less than novel, one signifi­
cant virtue of Shachar's treatment is the context she brings to bear on 
the problem. As Joseph Carens has indicated, and as Shachar here 
echoes (p. 8), "we do not really understand what general principles 
and theoretical formulations mean until we see them interpreted and 
applied in a variety of specific contexts. "55 Reflecting this concern, 
Shachar introduces several genuinely valuable examples of multicul­
tural experience throughout her book. And she does so not simply 
from well-recognized modern pluralistic states like the United States 
(pp. 18-20) and Canada (pp. 152-54), but also from countries as seem­
ingly diverse as India (pp. 80-84), Kenya (p. 55, n.43), and Israel (pp. 
79-80). Indeed, Shachar's description of the paradox as it arises in the 
arena of family law (ch. 3) is perhaps the most sustained contextual 
analysis of the problem of individual cultural vulnerability to date. 
Shachar describes family law as the "specific social arena where 
the multiculturalism paradox often hits hardest" (p. 11). Indeed, even 
absent multicultural accommodation, there is perhaps no communal 
realm more commonly conceptualized as private than that of the 
family, and collective privacy has been shown to breed individual 
persons joined in virtue of a particular set of group-generated prescriptions and unique nar­
ratives. P. 2; see also Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos 
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
54. See, e.g., KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11, at 38 (noting 
that some cultural groups "are concerned with controlling internal dissent, and seek group­
differentiated rights in order to impose internal restrictions on their members"); Kukathas, 
Cultural Toleration, supra note 24. at 88 ("[S]ignificant harms can be inflicted (by the domi­
nant powers in the group) on the most vulnerable members of a minority community. "); Su­
san Moller Okin, Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions, 108 ETHICS 661 (1998). 
55. CA RENS, supra note 18, at 3. 
1648 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:1635 
vulnerability.56 Yet, as Shachar points out, such vulnerability becomes 
even more acute as authority over the regulation of family life is 
devolved from the state, which is somewhat more likely to intervene 
to protect at-risk individuals, to the leaders of the family's cultural 
group, the traditional precepts of which may explicitly prescribe indi­
vidual vulnerability (p. 45). Moreover, since so many cultural groups 
define the contours of their communities according to familial lineage 
and marital-status rules (p. 52), group leaders are more likely to 
demand jurisdiction in the context of family law than in virtually any 
other legal arena (p. 57). "A nomoi group's membership rules, 
encoded in family law, thus provide the bonds which connect the past 
to the future, by identifying who is considered part of the tradition" 
(p. 46). Indeed, in the absence of authority over the rules, and there­
fore bounds, of group membership, a cultural community's capacity 
to preserve and further construct its unique collective identity must 
to some extent be sacrificed. And this will be particularly true of 
nonterritorial cultural groups, or "imagined communities" (p. 54), the 
membership boundaries of which can only be constructed socially. 
The collective constitutive autonomy enjoyed by virtue of state 
accommodation of cultural traditions is not without its costs, and 
Shachar's thorough exploration of the relationship between multicul­
tural accommodation and family law demonstrates the ways in which 
the costs of accommodation and collective autonomy are often borne 
disproportionately by the more vulnerable members of minority 
cultural groups, particularly women. "[W]omen occupy a special 
position in constituting collective identities" (p. 50), since they are 
"the bearers of legitimate children and [the] primary socializers of the 
young" (p. 55). Yet, ironically, the unique biological and social roles 
women occupy in the preservation and extension of cultural identities 
serve also to rationalize severe limitations on their life options (p. 56). 
For example, since many cultural groups view control over marriage 
and birth as critical elements in the demarcation of membership in 
their communities, such groups may seek to prescribe "how, when, 
and with whom women can give birth" (p. 52). Further, women may 
be denied educational and employment opportunities, and, in the 
event of divorce, inequitable property distribution rules may be 
applied, in an effort specifically to prevent women from abandoning 
their roles as bearers of the group's nomos (p. 56). 
Faced, at once, with seemingly imperative collective claims to 
cultural constitutive autonomy and self-determination, but also the 
knowledge that accommodation of such claims is likely only to 
perpetuate the vulnerability of particular categories of individuals 
within cultural groups, what resolution from the perspective of liberal 
56. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 134-69 (1989). 
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justice? How are we to respond to the paradox of multicultural 
vulnerability? In the central portion of her book, Shachar describes 
the currently prevailing responses to the paradox, each of which she 
characterizes as inadequate, and she then presents her own solution, 
centered on an innovative legal-institutional model. Yet, in the 
process, Shachar too readily discounts the extent to which her institu­
tional approach is derivative of, and indeed supported by, liberal­
multicultural theory. 
B. Responses to Multicultural Vulnerability 
Shachar discusses two primary theoretical responses, both of which 
serve as a source for a dominant legal approach, to the problem of 
multicultural vulnerability. The "re-universalized citizenship" re­
sponse (pp. 65-68), exhibited in the writings of persons such as Susan 
Moller Okin and Brian Barry,57 maintains that where the good of a 
particular individual and that of her cultural group conflict, the state 
must privilege the interests of the individual, even if the result is a 
radical severance of the individual from her. culture. Derivative of this 
first theoretical response, the "secular absolutist" legal model (pp. 72-
78) declines to accommodate the traditional practices of cultural 
groups, electing instead to preserve full state authority over, and so 
protection of, group members. In contrast, the "unavoidable costs" 
theoretical response (pp. 68-70), advocated most prominently by 
Chandran Kukathas,58 contends that the multicultural state must be 
severely constrained from intervening between a cultural group and its 
members, even given pervasive individual-rights violations. This 
second response, then, provides the underlying theoretical basis for 
the "religious particularist" legal model (pp. 78-85), which (predicta­
bly) grants far more extensive authority to cultural groups to pursue 
traditional beliefs and practices. 
Now, of course, these positions are essentially relabeled reitera­
tions of, on the one hand, premulticultural-universalistic liberalism, 
and, on the other, the toleration perspective on liberal multicultural­
ism.59 Nevertheless, Shachar's insightful criticism of certain aspects of 
the leading proponents' theories is worthy of attention. For example, 
Shachar seems clearly right in suggesting that Okin's sweeping view 
that multiculturalism necessarily degrades women fails to account for 
potential female agency, and so too radically discounts the prospect of 
57. P. 64; see BARRY, supra note 12; Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for 
Women?, 22 BOSTON REV. 25 (1997). 
58. P. 65; see Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, supra note 27; Kukathas, Cul­
tural Toleration, supra note 24. 
59. See supra Sections I.A-B Shachar's own theory, I contend below, is a working out of 
the autonomy perspective. 
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cultural change in virtue of that agency (p. 66). Similarly, Shachar 
demonstrates that Kukathas's position rests on some arguably dubious 
assumptions: first, while he relies heavily on individual freedom of 
association to justify multicultural accommodation, most cultural 
group members join at birth rather than as a result of any explicit con­
sensual act; and second, while cultural membership may as a matter of 
justice entail recognition and accommodation, so too might member­
ship in other social identity (for example, gender) groups (p. 70). 
Though she does not mention it in connection with her analysis of 
these two radically divergent theoretical responses, Shachar is also 
critical of a third, more moderate, response to the problem of multi­
cultural vulnerability. This third theoretical response - labeled at one 
point by Shachar as "weak multiculturalism" (p. 29) - is in fact none 
other than the autonomy perspective on liberal multiculturalism, 
described above, and conveyed most prominently by Will Kymlicka.60 
Yet, Shachar's critique of Kymlicka's theoretical approach is strange 
indeed, for Shachar's own prescriptive legal model appears to be 
grounded in Kymlicka's liberal-multicultural theory .. 
Recall that Kymlicka's theory of multicultural accommodation 
calls for equality between cultural groups, in the form of "external 
protections," but rejects claims pressed by cultural groups that would 
violate individual members' general rights, on the ground that such 
"internal restrictions" are inconsistent with liberal autonomy.61 In 
Multicultural Jurisdictions, Shachar contests Kymlicka's "too simple 
distinction between 'external' and 'internal' aspects of accommoda­
tion" (p. 42) on two grounds. First, Shachar challenges the "viability" 
of the distinction itself, arguing that the powers afforded to cultural 
groups in the name of external protections might also be used by the 
group to impose internal restrictions (p. 30). Second, Shachar claims 
that Kymlicka's approach, grounded as it is in liberal autonomy, is 
self-defeating, insofar as it advocates the extension of external protec­
tions notwithstanding potential restrictions on individual freedom.62 
But Shachar's critique of Kymlicka is misleading on both counts. 
Kymlicka's theory clearly does account for the possibility that "exter­
nal protections can open the door to internal restrictions."63 More 
60. See supra Section I.B. 
61. KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11,  at 35-44 
62. Kymlicka's model, Shachar says, "contradicts its own central tenet when it advocates 
accommodation even in cases where putting legal authority in the hands of the identity 
group means exposing certain group members to routine in-group violations of their individ­
ual citizenship rights. " P. 29. 
63. KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11, at 43; see also id. at 40 
("(P]olyethnic rights [might] be used to impose internal restrictions. "); id. at 42 ("This dis­
tinction between internal restrictions and external protections .. . is not always easy to draw. 
Measures designed to provide external protections often have implications for the liberty of 
members within the community. "); id. at 44, 153 (stating that internal restrictions "are incon-
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importantly, Kymlicka is manifestly hostile to the prospect of accom­
modative policy serving as cover for intragroup-rights violations.64 
Yet, while Shachar fails to demonstrate that Kymlicka's theory is 
misguided, she does reveal a sense in which his approach is incom­
plete. For while Kymlicka is clearly sensitive to the relationship be­
tween external protections and internal restrictions, he has not, to 
date, offered a means to detach cultural accommodation from intra­
group repression. Indeed, the most sensible reading of Shachar's 
approach may be as an institutional working out of Kymlicka's 
autonomy perspective on multicultural accommodation. Both 
Shachar's concern for the vulnerability of particular categories of indi­
viduals, and her insight that state protection of cultural groups might 
exacerbate unjust restrictions on the liberty of individual members, 
are already manifest in Kymlicka's work. Hence, despite Shachar's 
efforts to distance and distinguish herself from Kymlicka, it seems as if 
Kymlicka supplies the theoretical response to the problem of multicul­
tural vulnerability that underlies Shachar's own innovative legal 
model. 
III. TRANSFORMATIVE MULTICULTURALISM 
A. Four Models of Joint Governance 
Shachar critiques what she characterizes as the two dominant 
responses to multicultural vulnerability for imposing upon cultural 
group members an unfortunate and unnecessary ultimatum. Under 
either approach, it's "either your culture or your rights" (p. 5): 
Both approaches offer a misguided 'either/or' resolution to the paradox 
of multicultural vulnerability. Both require that women and other poten­
tially at-risk group members make a choice between their rights as citi­
zens or their group identities. But this amounts to a choice of penal­
ties . . . . Neither the 're-universalized citizenship' option nor the 
'unavoidable costs' approach has satisfactory answers to offer women 
and other members who legitimately wish to preserve both their cultural 
identities and to challenge the power relations encoded within their mi­
nority groups' traditions. (p. 71) 
sistent with any system of minority rights that appeals to individual freedom or personal 
autonomy"). 
64. Indeed, in an interesting exchange with Shachar, Kymlicka makes this point clear: 
It's clear that the capacity to impose internal restrictions is inextricably bound up with the 
acquisition of external protections, and so we need to analyse them together. However, my 
claim is that the goal, from a liberal point of view, is (a) to ensure that groups have the ex­
ternal protections they need, while (b) creating the institutional safeguards which prevent 
groups from imposing internal restrictions. 
Will Kymlicka, Comments on Shachar and Spinner-Halev: An Update from the M11/ticultur­
alism Wars, in MULTICULTURAL QUESTIONS 1 12, 127 n.7 (Christian Joppke & Steven Lukes 
eds., 1999). 
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In order, then, to transcend an ultimately insufferable choice 
between one's culture and one's freedom from cultural oppression -
and so to permit vulnerable individuals to continue to find meaning in 
their group memberships while simultaneously maintaining access to 
their general rights - Shachar suggests we must take an institutionalist 
turn. We must reexamine our assumptions with respect to jurisdiction 
itself, or the legal-institutional doctrine delineating public decisional 
authority (p. 72). Contrary to the preconceptions underlying the cur­
rently dominant legal and theoretical paradigms, it is not the case, says 
Shachar, that cultural group members must be subject solely to one 
source of legitimate authority, either the state or the group (p. 85). 
Indeed, "in today's day and age, no single authority can expect to be 
the sole source of legal norms and institutions affecting its members" 
(p. 15). Instead, Shachar contends, the only practicable solution to 
the paradox of multicultural vulnerability lies in a scheme of joint 
governance. 
A joint governance approach is grounded in what Shachar terms a 
" 'cultural' understanding of institutions" (p. 89). The approach recog­
nizes that individuals may concurrently belong to, and so derive rights 
and obligations from, multiple communities (p. 13). It thus seeks a 
solution to the complicated problem of multicultural accommodation 
and individual vulnerability by engendering interaction, and at times 
even open competition, between different sources of jurisdiction (p. 
88). Before rendering her own preferred joint governance structure, 
Shachar describes and assesses four already existing legal-institutional 
models that exhibit features of joint governance. The critical 
commonality among the four designs considered is in the idea that 
each may provide a means to escape the intolerable either/or dichot­
omy imposed by the more extreme universalist and particularist 
approaches described above. Under a joint governance institutional 
model, the expectation is that one may have one's rights and one's 
culture too. 
The first, and to those familiar with American governmental struc­
tures, most recognizable, form of joint governance is a "federal-style 
accommodation" approach, under which legal authority is allocated 
across different levels of government (p. 92). This devolution of juris­
dictional authority to more local agencies may provide an enhanced 
degree of collective autonomy to nomoi groups with substantial 
populations in a given region, while simultaneously constraining 
repressive group practices by virtue of generally applicable individual 
rights. Yet the very aspect of federalism that potentially yields more 
expansive cultural freedom, Shachar points out, serves also to limit the 
structure's efficacy more generally: the accommodationist resources of 
federalism are limited to territorially based groups (pp. 94-95). 
The second joint governance scheme, which Shachar describes as 
"temporal accommodation," divides authority over individual group 
May 2003] Vulnerability and Transformation 1653 
members between the state and the cultural group according to certain 
time intervals linked to those traditions conceived of as most critical to 
the preservation of the group's nomos (p. 97). Shachar in fact suggests 
that the well-known case Wisconsin v. Yoder65 might be viewed as an 
illustration of temporal accommodation, insofar as the Amish children 
involved in the case fell within the jurisdiction of state educational 
authorities until eighth grade, but within the jurisdiction of the cultural 
group beyond that point (p. 98). Yet, as above, the same aspect of 
temporal accommodation that serves to maintain the group nomos 
also condemns the scheme; for during the period of time that members 
remain subject to the jurisdictional authority of the group, individuals 
necessarily also remain vulnerable to culturally enacted repression (p. 
103). 
The third form of joint governance, termed "consensual accom­
modation," allocates a one-time choice among jurisdictional frame­
works to each individual (p. 103). So, for example, a member of a par­
ticular religious group might decide to marry in accordance with her 
group's traditions, or she may instead opt for a state-sanctioned 
ceremony. The authority selected would then also have jurisdiction 
over the dissolution of that relationship. A virtue of the consensual 
accommodation model, then, is its aspiration to promote individual 
agency in the affirmation of cultural attachments. Yet, as with other 
consent-derivative structures, the consensual approach presupposes 
that choice is truly free - at best an arguable supposition in the realm 
of cultural membership, and doubly so with respect to vulnerable 
group members. Moreover, the conclusive nature of the choice, 
Shachar observes, fails to protect individual members from the un­
foreseeable consequences of their jurisdictional decisions. While "(i]t 
might seem like a merely symbolic and natural decision at the time, to 
preserve the traditions of one's forebears by celebrating marriage in 
accordance with the group's practices" (p. 108), the constraints 
imposed by one's culture on divorce or childrearing might be far less 
bearable. Indeed, the one-time character of the jurisdictional decision 
merely resurrects, rather than remedies, the either/or culture/rights 
conundrum. 
The final model considered by Shachar, prior to her own, is the 
"contingent accommodation" model. Here jurisdictional autonomy is 
devolved from the state to nomoi groups in particular legal contexts 
deemed essential to the group's cultural identity, but only so long as 
the group's implementation of its authority rises above state-defined 
minimum standards (p. 109). The most immediate problem with this 
approach, Shachar suggests, is the almost certain perpetuation of 
cultural partiality, in light of the state's singular role in delineating 
65. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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standards. Ian Shapiro, among other theorists, has sought to redress 
such bias, while still averting cultural repression, through the creation 
of multidimensional regulatory structures.66 Under such an approach, 
matters would be divided as subject either to state or cultural primary 
jurisdiction, but with the alternate authority serving in a "back-up" 
role as a source of secondary jurisdiction (p. 111 ). Thus, the cultural 
entity might exercise primary authority within a context critical to its 
nomos, and the state would retain primary jurisdiction within contexts 
more generally critical to human well-being, but in each case a secon­
dary authority would strive to ensure the legitimacy of the decision 
reached. 
Despite the promise she sees in this sort of dynamic interactive 
approach to joint governance, Shachar questions the contingent 
model's practicability: For example, would state or cultural norms 
determine error? While the state might surely intervene in cultural 
affairs, by what mechanism could the cultural group intervene in state 
affairs? Moreover, by leaving the division of primary authority to state 
and cultural auspices, the virtue of individual agency raised by the 
consensual model is sacrificed. Individual members are thus "forced to 
play the role of whistleblowers (informing the other jurisdictional 
authority of violations of their rights by the other entity), instead of 
being allowed to work as authors" of the institutional structure 
designed to protect their own interests (p. 113; emphasis added). 
Hence, all four extant models of joint governance present institu­
tional structures designed, in recognition of persons' multiple attach­
ments, to compel interaction between state and cultural sources of 
authority. While each approach presents certain virtues, each also, in 
its own way, fails ultimately to accommodate cultural differences while 
simultaneously protecting vulnerable group members from cultural 
repression. In what then lies the solution to the paradox of multicul­
tural vulnerability? The fatal flaw, Shachar believes, common to each 
institutional design so far considered, lies in the failure of each 
approach to hinge the accommodation of traditional group practices 
on the reduction of intragroup repression (pp. 89, 113). To do so, says 
Shachar, we need an institutional structure of joint governance specifi­
cally designed to induce cultural elites, and to empower vulnerable 
individuals, to transform their cultures from within (p. 14). 
B. Cultural Transformation 
As with the four institutional schemes described above, indeed 
incorporating certain of their more salutary aspects, Shachar's "trans­
formative accommodation" model embraces the notion of multiple 
66. See IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE (1999). 
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sources of authority linked to persons' "multiple identity-creating 
affiliations" (p. 118). What distinguishes transformative accommoda­
tion from previously considered joint governance models, according to 
Sha char, is three core principles. 
First, the transformative model would divide jurisdiction between 
the state and cultural groups not merely along traditional subject 
matter lines (for example, education, family law, criminal justice), but 
also within each social context. Thus, neither the state nor the group 
would maintain exclusive jurisdiction with respect to, say, marriage; 
instead, the cultural group might retain power over issues of status and 
membership, while the state might exercise authority over the distri­
bution of property (pp. 119-20). The point of this first condition, which 
Shachar terms "the 'sub-matter' allocation of authority" (p. 118), 
is both to permit concurrent state and cultural influence over 
group members and to compel interaction among those sources of 
authority.67 
Shachar's second principle she calls "the 'no monopoly' rule" (p. 
118). "According to this rule, neither the group nor the state can ever 
acquire exclusive control over a contested social arena that affects 
individuals both as group members and as citizens" (p. 121). But this 
requirement seems an effective corollary of the first; allocating juris­
diction within contested social contexts according to "sub-matters," 
and mandating that no single authority maintain monopoly power 
over any contested social context, seem but two sides of the same 
coin.68 
Shachar's third principle, "the establishment of clearly delineated 
choice options" (p. 118), does a bit more work. With this condition, 
Shachar's model offers members of cultural groups a wholly new 
option, and a new instrument for change: it offers at-risk individuals a 
partial exit. Individual members, Shachar proposes, "must have clear 
options which allow them to choose between the jurisdiction of the 
state and the nomoi group. Choice here means that they can remain 
within the submatter jurisdiction of the original power-holder 
(approval) or that they can resist that jurisdictional authority at 
predefined 'reversal' points (disapproval)" (p. 122). According to 
Shachar's theory, the opportunity to invoke a partial exit would enable 
vulnerable individuals to exercise their rights as citizens of the state 
67. "Meaningful consideration of marriage and divorce rules thus requires a considera­
tion of both jurisdictions: the authority which governs each distinct legal sub-matter, as well 
as the complementary authority which jointly governs (or 'co-prevails') in a contested social 
arena. " P. 120. 
68. Shachar notes the inevitable inefficiencies that would be associated with a joint gov­
ernance model, like hers, that requires interaction across jurisdictions to resolve fully any 
dispute. She contends that on balance any loss in judicial economy is more than compen­
sated for by the gain registered from a critical review of cultural traditions and (somewhat 
vaguely) of federalist-institutional structures more generally. Pp. 130-31. 
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without sacrificing their cultural identity. Even more, by affording 
individuals the option to choose between cultural and state sources of 
authority, this model would engender competition between jurisdic­
tions, and, with it, the capacity for cultural transformation (p. 123). 
One example, indeed one that recurs in Shachar's treatment (pp. 
57-60, 133-35), is the traditional Jewish notion of an "anchored 
woman," or an agunah. Under Jewish law, a married woman cannot 
initiate a religious divorce (a get), and so become free to remarry 
within her faith, without first obtaining her husband's consent.69 The 
consequences of the doctrine are frequently quite severe; a recalci­
trant or abusive husband might engage in blackmail, leaving an 
agunah with no choice beyond ceding undeserved (typically, property 
or custodial) rights to her husband or abandoning her cultural 
membership (pp. 58-59). Consider, though, how the situation might 
change under an accommodation model that empowers vulnerable 
individuals by offering them clearly delineated choice options. The 
agunah seeking a divorce would be afforded an opportunity partially 
to exit; that is, to sever her current relationship pursuant to state juris­
diction. She would then be free (by force, if necessary) to remarry in 
accordance with her cultural traditions.70 Hence, partial exit may 
enable a vulnerable member of a cultural group to exercise her 
general rights as a citizen of a liberal state, yet also retain her particu­
lar cultural identity. 
Shachar's most critical point here, though, is not merely that 
partial exits should be made available, but that where partial exits are 
made available, they will rarely be needed. Faced with the prospect of 
selective exit, indeed faced with exit by the biological and social 
"bearers" of the group's nomos,71 cultural leaders will have a strong 
incentive to reinterpret their texts and traditions in ways that enable 
them to reverse oppressive and discriminatory practices.72 "Avoiding 
the reversal of jurisdiction becomes a matter of self-interest to the 
group, since it allows the group to protect whatever degree of self­
regulating power it has already secured over its members, rather than 
risk losing it piecemeal" (p. 125). The partial exit is thus not an end in 
itself, but an instrument of cultural change. It is a risk imposed upon 
cultural elites, the avoidance of which entails the avoidance of cultural 
repression. Moreover, by devolving jurisdictional decisions to indi-
69. Pp. 57-58. For the biblical source of this doctrine, see Deuteronomy 24:1 .  
70. "At this point, the state will acquire (group-backed) authority to enforce the re­
moval of all barriers to remarriage (even if the marriage was originally created by religious 
solemnization)." P. 135. 
71 .  See supra Section II.A. 
72. "Nomoi communities are living entities. They are not suicidal in nature. Most have 
ample resources for re-interpretations which permit them to preserve their nomos while 
adaptively responding to change. " P. 140. 
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victuals themselves, the transformative model creates "a dynamic new 
space for meaningful participatory group membership" (p. 123). The 
transformation of culture is thus accomplished not merely from on 
high, but broadly in virtue of the actions and expectations of all group 
members, including those individuals historically more vulnerable. In 
that sense, Shachar's design seemingly aspires to democratize culture. 
One obvious criticism sure to be leveled against Shachar by the 
proponents of a more accommodating approach to cultural practice 
(for example, the toleration perspective), would consist in the notion 
that any state-imposed cultural change, regardless of the particular 
agents of that change, necessarily fails to treat cultural groups justly.73 
A culture transformed from within, but only in virtue of a structural 
remedy imposed from without, is no different, according to this "non­
interventionist" view, than a culture transformed directly by the state 
(p. 37). Shachar has a response to this view, however. She asserts that 
cultural practice, at least in modern multicultural states, is critically 
enmeshed within a broader social context: "[T]he group and the state 
are both viable and mutable social entities which are constantly af­
fecting each other through their ongoing interactions" (p. 1 18). 
Indeed, Shachar suggests that it may in fact be interaction with an 
overly accommodationist state that unnaturally arrests the otherwise 
"organic processes of [cultural] change" (p. 85). In response to a state 
which affords expansive jurisdiction to groups on the basis of cultural 
difference, cultural elites have incentives to maintain such differences 
in order to maintain their authority, even where the maintenance of 
difference entails the maintenance of oppressive practices.74 Hence, 
Shachar notes an important, if rather ironic, sense in which transfor­
mative accommodation might actually enable, rather than subvert, the 
normal processes of collective cultural self-determination. Of course, 
in light of the uniformly antirepressive ends she expects her model to 
provoke, to accept Shachar's premise (that state-imposed cultural 
transformation merely frees the culture to evolve as it naturally 
would) one would also have to believe that cultures naturally evolve in 
a linear, and uniquely progressive, fashion. 
Yet even placing alternative perspectives to one side, Shachar's 
model is problematic on its own terms because it is radically underde­
veloped. Recall that, as articulated by Shachar, transformative 
accommodation is premised on three (really just two )75 principles: (1) 
the "sub-matter allocation of authority"; (2) the "no monopoly rule"; 
and (3) "the establishment of clearly delineated choice options" (p. 
73. Shachar notes that, in this sense, her transformative model might be perceived "as 
indirect intervention into the group's 'private' affairs, a multicultural state acting ultra vires." 
P. 1 26 n.20. 
74. Shachar terms this phenomenon "reactive culturalism." Pp. 35-37. 
75. See text accompanying supra note 68. 
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118). The first two principles, as we have seen, combine to encourage 
interaction between the state and cultural groups from a structural 
perspective. The third is intended to provide individuals with an 
instrument of cultural and political change. 
Shachar has thus proposed a highly interactive design pursuant to 
which both cultural groups and the state will be induced better to serve 
individual members.76 Yet virtually all of Shachar's analysis in 
Multicultural Jurisdictions is inclined toward cultural adaptation. Even 
assuming the accuracy of her view that cultural group leaders, facing 
selective exit, will reinterpret their traditions, in what sense would 
we expect the state to react? Given the paradox of multicultural 
vulnerability only arises once the state has demonstrated its willing­
ness to accommodate repressive cultural practices, why would we 
suddenly expect the state to seek to protect vulnerable members? In 
Shachar's terms, how will minority cultural group members be able to 
"discipline" the state with the threat of "opting-out" (p. 122), when 
the state has already shown itself uninterested in their plight? The 
basic notion of empowering individuals through a competitive jurisdic­
tional mechanism to engender social change may itself be promising, 
but Schachar leaves almost wholly unexamined the public side of this 
state-cultural group interface. 
Moreover, the principles that compose Shachar's model, and that 
serve to construct her transformative-accommodation design, presup­
pose state-cultural group negotiation; both the initial allocation of 
sub-matter jurisdiction, and the delineation of reversal points, will be 
subject to bargaining among state and cultural authorities (pp. 128-30). 
Shachar assumes that each authority would seek jurisdiction in 
sub-matters most central to its core mission; hence, the group would 
likely seek influence over questions pertinent to its survival, while the 
state would aim toward acquiring jurisdiction over issues of civic 
participation (p. 129). Yet, other than noting that at-risk group 
members must not be "den[ied) voice" (p. 129 n.22), that "generosity 
at the negotiation stage is required from the state as the stronger 
party" (p. 130), and that vaguely stated "incentives" exist for authori­
ties to self-regulate and so "engage in constructive dialogue" (p. 130), 
Shachar's model does little to institutionalize this critical process. 
Surely there will be matters deemed crucial within both state and 
cultural spheres (for example, both state and cultural sources of 
authority might view jurisdiction over education as indispensable ).77 
76. P. 117 ("Transformative accommodation seeks to adapt the power structures of both 
nomoi group and state."). 
77. In her appendix, Shachar helpfully describes various potential products of a joint 
governance scheme in the context of education, see pp. 1 54-60, but she fails, here and else­
where, to describe adequately the means by which a dispute among sources of authority over 
the initial allocation of submatter jurisdiction in the educational context would be resolved. 
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On such contested matters, what process will be invoked to resolve 
disputes? Would the state simply prevail, in virtue of its greater power 
(perhaps a reasonable, but unexplained result)? Or might something 
in the way of a neutral arbiter be appointed? At present, it is difficult 
to say. Beyond the few indistinct stipulations noted above, Shachar 
merely declares that the process of allocating authority and identifying 
choice options be approached "carefully" and with "precision" (pp. 
128-29). 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Shachar's treatment here 
of individual will is overly facile. Clearly, competition between state 
and cultural sources of authority will only be engendered, and so 
cultural transformation realized, where group members have options. 
But the presence of options is merely a necessary and not a sufficient 
precondition for competition.78 For a model premised on competition 
to be effective, individuals must not only have clearly delineated 
choice options but also the capacity to exercise such options. There are, 
though, reasons to expect that capacity to be limited in the multicul­
tural context. First, while constitutive attachments are surely more 
susceptible to individual will than is sometimes imagined, they none­
theless are often quite difficult to abandon.79 Even (perhaps particu­
larly) the more vulnerable members of nomoi groups may feel deeply 
obligated to conform to religious and other cultural dictates. Second, 
individuals socialized within a particular nomos to be compliant -
individuals socialized into vulnerability, that is - may have a particu­
larly difficult time suddenly exercising agency.80 Hence, for the most 
vulnerable members of cultural groups to exercise even a partial exit, 
much more in the way of state-sponsored resources and intervention 
will often be required. While the married woman in the agunah illus­
tration might have been in a position to make a genuine choice,81 
individuals involved in more extreme cultural contexts almost surely 
would not. 
78 .. Shachar herself appears to recognize this point, see p. 138, and yet she nonetheless 
fails to incorporate directly into her model any provision that would guarantee the agency 
required for competition to take place. 
79. For a view of the self as essentially encumbered by communal attachments, see 
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT, supra note 7, at 13-17. For an opposing view of the 
self as rationally revisable, see Rawls, supra note 26, at 543-45. 
80. The reference here is to the well-developed literature on unseen dimensions of 
power. See JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE ANO REBELLION 
IN AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY (1980); STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974). 
Shachar notes this literature in a tangential context, p. 136 n.36, but fails to apply its teach­
ings to her core assumptions. 
81. Indeed, an agunah 's choices today are often not as limited as Shachar indicates. 
More progressive leaders in the Orthodox Jewish movement "have to varying degrees ame­
liorated a woman's legal disability . . . either in ways ostensibly faithful to the legal system or 
in ways that reject the legal system more broadly." Letter from Rabbi Jeremy Kalmanofsky, 
Jewish Theological Seminary, to the author (Sept. 10, 2002) (on file with author).  
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Imagine, for example, the following paradigm: in a local jurisdic­
tion, governed according to a strict interpretation of cultural law, one 
woman, call her Amina, has given birth to a child outside of wedlock; 
another woman, Mukhtaran, happens to be related to a young boy 
seen in the company of a girl from a higher caste. Tribal authorities 
sentence Amina, after allowing her an interval of one year to wean her 
child, to death by stoning. They order Mukhtaran to submit to a gang­
rape.82 How might these women have exercised an option to switch to 
a public source of authority? How might these women even have 
learned that such an option existed? In addition to submatter alloca­
tions and clearly delineated choice options, a model premised on indi­
vidual agency in a multicultural context must, at a minimum, provide 
for the sort of social, educational, and financial resources at-risk group 
members require to recognize, and take advantage of, jurisdictional 
options.83 
CONCLUSION: THE ROAD AHEAD 
Shachar has chosen Robert Frost's well-known allegory of two 
roads diverging in a wood as both prologue and epilogue to her new 
work on multiculturalism. "Instead of resorting to so many already 
established, tired and misguided approaches toward a just and work­
able multiculturalism," she writes, "we must follow the road less 
traveled" (p. 150). Though too much of Multicultural Jurisdictions is 
itself reiteration of established approaches to multiculturalism, 
Shachar, I think, has indeed revealed a new path: the path of a trans­
formative multiculturalism, for which we are most fortunate. Yet it is 
equally unfortunate that Shachar herself has not moved very far along 
that path. Perhaps she now leaves it for others to show the way. Or 
perhaps she will return to the subject in some forthcoming work. One 
certainly hopes so, for Shachar has shown herself a gifted guide, and 
the path she has revealed will not be easy going. Indeed, given the 
extent of the problem of individual vulnerability, and the resources 
required to solve it, we may have miles to go before we sleep. 
82. The scenarios depicted are derived from actual stories. See Norimitsu Onishi, 
Mother 's Sentence Unsettles a Nigerian Village, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2002, at A3; Beena Sar­
war, Brutality Cloaked as Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2002, at AlS. 
83. Shachar's treatment of these critical issues is fleeting, at best. See pp. 1 24, 1 38-39. 
Her project would be better served had she built these as preconditions directly into her 
model and explored pragmatically how they might be achieved. 
